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CARRYBACKS AND THE (F) REORGANIZATION
Coorporations may reorganize without the tax consequences of a
sale or exchange by conforming to any one of the six types of nontax-
able reorganizations defined in section 368(a) (1) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code.' If the new corporation incurs losses after the reorganiza-
tion, it will desire the tax benefit of a refund by carrying back the
losses to pre-reorganization income.2 Such a refund is available to a
corporation that existed prior to the reorganization; however, if an
entirely new entity was formed in the reorganization, it may not
carry back its losses to the transferor corporation's income unless
the reorganization complied with section 368(a) (1) (F) .3 This exemp-
tion, created for (F) reorganizations, requires that the new corpora-
tion be essentially the same entity, having undergone "a mere
change in identity, form, or place of organization, however ef-
fected."4
1. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A)-(F). The six nontaxable reorganizations include: (A) reorganiza-
tions, statutory mergers and consolidations; the (B) reorganization, acquisition of the stock
of one corporation by another; the (C) reorganization, acquisition of the assets of one corpora-
tion by another; the (D) reorganization, transfer of substantially all the assets from one
corporation to another; (E) reorganizations, recapitalizations; and (F) reorganizations,
changes in identity, form, or place of organization. Id.
2. I.R.C. § 172, which governs the net operating loss carryback, pr9vides in part: "There
shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year an amount equal to the aggregate of (1)
the net operating loss carryovers to such year, plus (2) the net operating loss carrybacks to
such year." Id. § 172(a). Section 172 also provides that "a net operating loss for any taxable
year ending after December 31, 1957, shall be a net operating loss carryback to each of the 3
taxable years preceding the taxable year of such loss," id. § 172(b)(1)(A)(i), and it defines
the net operating loss as "the excess of the deductions allowed by this chapter over the gross
income. Such excess shall be computed with the modifications specified in subsection (d)."
Id. § 172(c). Corporations must modify their net operating loss to account for dividends
received, partially exempt interest under id. § 242, or income relating to Western Hemisphere
trade corporations under id. § 922. Id. § 172(d)(5)-(6).
3. Id. § 381(b). Section 381(b) provides in pertinent part:
Operating Rules. - Except in the case of an acquisition in connection with a
reorganization described in subparagraph (F) of section 368(a) (1)-
(3) The corporation acquiring property in a distribution or transfer de-
scribed in subsection (a) shall not be entitled to carry back a net operating loss
or a net capital loss for a taxable year ending after the date of distribution or
transfer to a taxable year of the distributor or transferor corporation.
'Loss carrybacks may be applied to all income except that of a transferor corporation no
longer in existence after the reorganization. No restriction exists on loss carrybacks to the pre-
reorganization income of an acquiring corporation that survives the reorganization. Id. §
381(b)(3).
4. Id. § 368(a)(1)(F).
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Exactly what constitutes an (F) reorganization currently is un-
clear. In 1966, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) argued success-
fully for the expansion of a previously narrow definition to prevent
certain tax abuses, 5 but the IRS now strongly opposes the applica-
tion of this expanded definition in situations concerning corpora-
tions' eligibility for loss carrybacks. Consequently, the IRS,' the Tax
Court,7 several courts of appeals, 8 and the Court of Claims9 are in
apparent conflict as to the nature of the (F) reorganization and its
application to loss carrybacks.
This Note will outline the history and recent expansion of the (F)
reorganization. It will describe the effect of this expansion in situa-
tions involving loss carrybacks, focusing on the economic reality of
(F) reorganizations and the congressional intent as to loss carry-
backs. This Note also will identify the conflicting treatments of
(F) reorganizations resulting from this recent expansion and will
attempt to reconcile these divergent viewpoints in a manner consis-
tent with the expansive trends.
(F) REORGANIZATIONS
Background
Introduced in 1921,10 the (F) reorganization's purpose was to char-
5. Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966); Davant v. Commissioner, 366
F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
6. Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 C.B. 129.
7. Romy Hammes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 900 (1977) (carryback not allowed to the
income of one of several pre-merger corporations because lack of absolute continuity of share-
holder interest prevented transaction's characterization as an (F) reorganization and because
the particular pre-merger corporation not engaged in business venture creating loss); Berger
Mach. Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 358 (1977) (merger of four operating corporations
not an (F) reorganization when continuity of shareholder interest not absolute).
8. Home Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1971) (merger
of 123 functionally related and commonly owned corporations an (F) reorganization); Estate
of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968) (merger of three corporations owned
by one shareholder into corporate shell both an (F) and an (A) reorganization); Associated
Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968) (merger of two corporations an (F)
reorganization).
9. Movielab, Inc. v. United States, 494 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (merger of wholly owned
subsidiary into parent corporation an (F) reorganization).
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1921, ch. 2, § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230 (now I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F)).
Section 202 originally defined an (F) reorganization as a "mere change in identity, form or
place of organization of a corporation (however effected)." Id. In 1924 Congress eliminated
the words "of a corporation" but explained this alteration as a change only in wording. H.R.
REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924). Despite numerous re-enactments of the provi-
sion, Congress never elaborated on the ultimate limits of the definition.
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acterize as one continuing entity a corporation that moved its domi-
cile by reincorporating in another state or that made some other
formal changes." The initial narrow breadth of the (F) reorganiza-
tion created little controversy,' 2 in that the provision applied only
to formal corporate changes that did not alter the entity's status as
a taxpayer.' 3 Reflecting the statute's limited application, the Su-
preme Court in 1942 determined that an (F) reorganization must
have resulted in no shift of corporate ownership in Helvering v.
Southwest Consolidated Corp.4 In that decision, the Court rejected
summarily an alternative argument that an insolvency reorganiza-
tion under which the secured creditors of a corporation succeeded
to majority control constituted an (F) reorganization, stating: "a
transaction which shifts the ownership of the proprietary interest in
a corporation is hardly 'a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization' ... "15
11. (F) reorganizations are characterized by mere formalistic changes that result in no shift
in ownership. See S. REP. No. 2090, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4454, which discussed the exemption from a stamp tax of stock delivered
pursuant to an (F) reorganization. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 34, § 4382(b)(1)(D), 72 Stat.
1302 (repealed 1977). Although the Senate report did not mention expressly (F) reorganiza-
tions, its definition of a qualifying reorganization was identical to the Code's definition of that
type. Therefore, the explanation is applicable to (F) reorganizations. See Columbia Gas, Inc.
v. United States, 366 F.2d 991 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
The Supreme Court's decision in Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1926), decided under
the 1913 Internal Revenue Code, illustrates the need for the (F) reorganization. After General
Motors had moved its domicile from New Jersey to Delaware, the government taxed a share-
holder on purported gain. The Court held that the reincorporation produced a new entity
because Delaware's corporation law provided different rights and duties than did the law in
New Jersey. Id. at 541. Furthermore, in focusing on Code provisions that make no reference
to § 368, courts have not treated as the same entity a corporation that has changed its place
of incorporation. See, e.g., Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. United States, 195 F.2d 1012 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 818 (1952); American Gas Mach. Co. v. Willcuts, 84 F.2d 925
(7th Cir. 1936).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921). See generally Rev. Rul. 64-250,
1964-2 C.B. 333; Rev. Rul. 54-269, 1954-2 C.B. 114.
13. The tax year of a corporation formed in any type of reorganization, except the (F) type,
ends on the day the reorganization is completed. I.R.C. § 381(b)(1)-(2). In contrast, the
Regulations state that the corporation formed in an (F) reorganization must be treated as if
no reorganization has occurred. Treas. Reg. § 1.381(b)-i (1960). Similarly, the small business
loss provision mandates that the corporation created in an (F) reorganization be treated in
the same manner as was its predecessor. I.R.C. § 1244(d). In accordance with this treat-
ment, Congress has provided that the successor corporation in an (F) reorganization, unlike
those formed in other types, may carry back its operating losses to its pre-reorganization
income. Id. § 381(b)(3). For the text of § 381(b)(3), see note 3 supra.
14. 315 U.S. 194, 203 (1942).
15. Id.
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In the 1960's, the IRS began invoking the (F) reorganization pro-
vision to prevent taxpayers from using formalistic sale and liquida-
tion transactions to convert ordinary income into capital gains. Al-
though these transactions were accomplished through a variety of
methods, they essentially involved the transfer of a business, with-
out its accumulated earnings, to a second corporation, which then
continued operations. The old corporation subsequently liquidated,
distributing its accumulated earnings to the shareholders at capital
gain rates. The IRS maintained that the first corporation had not
been liquidated but, instead, had undergone "a mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization," that is, an (F) reorganiza-
tion." Consequently, because the proceeds from the old corpora-
tion's purported liquidation were paid from earnings, argued the
IRS, they were dividends taxable at ordinary income rates rather
than distributions of capital upon liquidation taxable at capital
gain rates.'7
In 1966, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit accepted
the IRS's position in Davant v. Commissioner'8 and Reef Corp. v.
Commissioner." The results of these cases, however, introduced two
new dimensions to the concept of the (F) reorganization. In Davant
the court determined that the merger of two operating companies
constituted an (F) reorganization, 0 and in Reef Corp. it character-
ized a transaction that involved a substantial shift in ownership
interests resulting from the redemption of all the stock of some
shareholders as an (F) reorganization.2' Other courts subsequently
applied this expanded concept of the (F) reorganization in factual
situations different from those presented in Davant and Reef Corp.,
particularly to permit the carryback of post-reorganization losses to
pre-reorganization income. 21
16. See, e.g., Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966); Davant v. Commis-
sioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967); Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-
2 C.B. 62.
17. Dividend distributions, to the extent of the corporation's earnings, are taxed as ordi-
nary income, I.R.C. §§ 301, 316. Taxed more favorably, proceeds from a corporation's liqui-
dation or from a stock redemption are regarded first as a return of capital and then as capital
gain. Id. §§ 302, 331.
18. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
19. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966).
20. 366 F.2d at 884.
21. 368 F.2d at 134-37.
22. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S.T.C. 9120 (2d Cir. 1976); Home
Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1971); Associated Mach.
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Merger of Operating Corporations
In Davant one corporation sold its operating assets for cash to a
second operating corporation. The shareholders owned identical
percentage interests in each entity. After the sale, the transferor
corporation was liquidated, and both its retained earnings and the
cash received on the sale of the business were distributed to its
shareholders.s Under a technical interpretation of the Code, this
transaction enabled the stockholders to receive both corporations'
accumulated earnings at capital gain rates, while permitting the
business to continue uninterrupted.24 The IRS, however, argued that
these actions functionally constituted an (F) reorganization rather
than a bona fide sale and liquidation.s
The Fifth Circuit upheld the IRS's position, finding that the
transaction was an (F) reorganization and, therefore, that a divi-
dend had been paid to the extent of both corporations' earnings and
profits.2 The court noted that, although the transaction concep-
tually satisfied the requirements of a sale and liquidation, it lacked
a business purpose.Y Moreover, even though the acquiring corpora-
tion possessed its own assets, the transaction had effected changes
only in the form, rather than in the substance, of the two corpora-
tions.2 Finally, the court held that the "liquidation" distributions
actually were dividends paid simultaneously with, but functionally
v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968); Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d
611 (9th Cir. 1968); Performance Syss., Inc. v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 525 (M.D. Tenn.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 501 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1974); Movielab, Inc. v. United States, 494
F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
23. Because the transaction maintained a continuity of the stockholder's interests in both
the acquiring and the transferor corporations, it might have been characterized as a (D)
reorganization. See note 1 supra. To avoid such a classification, an "unrelated party," the
son of the lawyer who planned the sale and liquidation, purchased the transferor corporation's
stock and completed the transaction, thus receiving the liquidation proceeds. The lawyer's
son used these proceeds to pay the original shareholders his "purchase" price of their stock,
retaining a profit for his efforts. The original owners claimed that they recognized capital
gains on the sale of their stock. 366 F.2d at 878-79.
24. Id. See note 23 supra.
25. 366 F.2d at 879. Agreeing with one of the IRS's alternative theories, the Tax Court
disregarded the purported sale to the attorney's son and found that the transaction was a (D)
reorganization. Id. at 883. See note 23 supra. Consequently, it concluded that the distribu-
tions were dividends, which were taxable as ordinary income to the extent of the transferor
corporation's earnings. 366 F.2d at 883.
26. Id. at 887-89.
27. Id. at 882.
28. Id. at 884.
1978]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
unrelated to, the reorganization. 2
In its characterization of the transaction in Davant as an (F)
reorganization and an unrelated dividend distribution, the Fifth
Circuit prevented the taxpayers from receiving unwarranted capital
gains in lieu of ordinary income. The court's expanded concept of
(F) reorganizations, however, could be applicable in situations in-
volving similar mergers of two or more operating corporations that
were unaccompanied by any dividend payments. Taxpayers would
desire such an expanded application in circumstances presenting
the possibility of loss carrybacks, because section 381(b) (3) prohib-
its an acquiring corporation from carrying back its post-
reorganization losses to the pre-reorganization income of the trans-
feror corporation unless the reorganization was an (F) type.30 By
enlarging the definition of (F) reorganizations to include the merger
of two operating corporations, the decision in Davant thus increases
the availability of post-reorganization loss carrybacks to pre-
reorganization income. 31
The IRS initially opposed the application of Davant to allow post-
reorganization loss carrybacks after a merger of two operating corpo-
rations, and the Tax Court supported this position.32 Nevertheless,
the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,33 Sixth,34 and Ninth Circuits,35
as well as the Court of Claims, 3 have applied Davant's expanded
concept of the (F) reorganization in situations involving loss carry-
backs, and the IRS now has accepted the proposition.37 Subjecting
the availability of this concession to a strict continuity of interest
test, however, the IRS requires that both the shareholders and their
percentage interests in the corporation be identical before and after
the reorganization. 38
29. Id. at 888.
30. I.R.C. § 381(b)(3). For text of § 381(b)(3), see note 3 supra.
31. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
32. See, e.g., Romy Hammes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 900 (1977); Berger Mach.
Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 358 (1977); Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.
277 (1967), reu'd, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968); Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.
318 (1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968).
33. See, e.g., Home Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir.
1971).
34. See, e.g., Performance Syss., Inc. v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 525 (M.D. Tenn.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 501 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1974).
35. See, e.g., Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968); Estate of
Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968).
36. Movielab, Inc. v. United States, 494 F.2d 693 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
37. Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 C.B. 129.
38. Id. The Revenue Ruling prescribes three requirements: complete identity of sharehold-
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Unrelated Redemption
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Reef Corp. provides a means for
attacking the IRS's reliance on the continuity of shareholder inter-
est test to limit the application of the (F) reorganization concept in
loss carryback situations. Decided soon after Davant, Reef Corp.
involved another attempt by stockholders to characterize dividends
as capital gains through the device of a sale of the business to a
newly organized corporation and a subsequent liquidation of the
transferor corporation. The transaction, which included the re-
demption of forty-eight percent of the transferor corporation's stock,
created a substantial change in the identity of the shareholder's
interests."
Notwithstanding the stock redemption, the Fifth Circuit charac-
terized the transaction as an (F) reorganization." The court re-
garded the (F) reorganization and the stock redemption as function-
ally separate events;4 it noted that, with the exception of the re-
demption, the only other alterations, which consisted of changes in
the corporation's name and its state of incorporation, were char-
acteristics common to an (F) reorganization.42 Moreover, although
the redemption was a feature of a reorganization, it nevertheless had
ers and their proprietary interests, operation of related businesses, and continuation of the
businesses in the new form. Id.; see Cole & Brezak, Meeting the IRS' New F Reorganization
Tests; Requirements; Planning Potential, 4 J. op TAx. 344 (1976).
39. The transaction in Reef Corp. eliminated 48% of the stockholders' interest through a
redemption of stock for cash and notes and also converted some of the remaining majority
shareholders' stock into notes. Hoping to avoid an immediate tax on their receipt of the notes,
the majority shareholders insisted that all the stock be sold to an "unrelated party," an
attorney associated with the minority stockholders, for his personal notes. The attorney sold
all the old corporation's assets to a new corporation that had been organized by the majority
shareholders who, in exchange for some of their stock in the old corporation, received 100%
of the new corporation's stock. In a subsequent liquidation of the old corporation, the attorney
received the notes that the new corporation had exchanged for the old corporation's assets,
and he pledged them as security for the personal notes he had given to the original sharehold-
ers. In effect, then, the new corporation paid for the attorney's stock purchases. Moreover,
the majority stockholders, who had become the sole owners of the new corporation, chose to
defer the taxes payable on their receipt of the attorney's notes by electing the installment
method of reporting their gain. The new corporation also benefited because the assets it
purchased from the old corporation received a stepped-up cost basis for purposes of deter-
mining depreciation deductions against ordinary income. The IRS challenged this transaction
on the ground that the interest paid on the notes to the shareholders of the new corporation
was a dividend and therefore nondeductible. 368 F.2d at 127-28.
40. Id. at 137.
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id. at 136.
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no effect on the reorganization because the business continued un-
changed except in form 3
The decision in Reef Corp., like that in Davant, potentially ex-
panded the (F) reorganization's definition beyond the particular
abuse presented in that case. The Fifth Circuit's holding that an
(F) reorganization can be accompanied by a stock redemption
creating a shift in the shareholders' percentage interests has been
applied to characterize as an (F) reorganization corporate changes
that do not conform with the IRS's strict continuity of interest
requirement" and thus to permit loss carrybacks under section
381(b)(3).11
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States"6 the Second
Circuit applied the decision in Reef Corp. to allow such a loss carry-
back.4 7 Aetna involved a transfer of a subsidiary corporation, sixty
percent of which was owned by the parent, to the latter's sharehold-
ers and a simultaneous conversion of the subsidiary's forty percent
minority interest into equal ownership shares in the parent and
subsidiary corporations. Pursuant to this goal, the parent corpora-
tion exchanged some of its stock for all the stock of a new corpora-
tion, which had been organized for the sole purpose of acquiring the
subsidiary corporation. In a merger this new corporation exchanged
the parent's stock for that of the subsidiary and then cancelled the
subsidiary's stock, assuming its business and continuing its opera-
tions as they had been conducted before the reorganization. Finally,
for the benefit of its shareholders, the parent transferred to a trust
its stock in the new corporation. As a result of the transaction, the
forty percent minority interest in the subsidiary became a twenty
percent interest in both the parent and the acquiring corporations.
Despite the alteration in the stockholders' percentage ownership
interests, however, the Second Circuit characterized these actions
as an (F) reorganization and an unrelated redemption, thus permit-
ting the new corporation to carry back its post-reorganization losses
to the subsidiary's pre-reorganization income. 8
43. Id.
44. See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
45. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S.T.C. 9120 (2d Cir. 1976); cf.
Casco Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 32 (1967), appeal dismissed, No. 32261 (2d Cir.
June 11, 1968) (carryback allowed because Tax Court held that corporate merger into a shell
corporation in order to redeem nine percent minority interest not a reorganization).
46. 77-1 U.S.T.C. 9120 (2d Cir. 1976).
47. Id. at 86,092.
48. Id. at 86,091. Aetna's precedential value may be questioned inasmuch as the taxpayer
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Both Reef Corp. and Aetna involved a substantial shift in share-
holder percentage interest. Nevertheless, in both cases, the trans-
feror corporation's business was continued unchanged by the ac-
quiring corporation, control was not altered, and no new sharehold-
ers were introduced. Under these circumstances, when one corpora-
tion's operations are transferred to a newly created corporate shell,
the Second and possibly the Fifth Circuits would reject the IRS's
requirement that a strict continuity of shareholder Interest accom-
pany an (F) reorganization before the transferee corporation may
carry back its losses to the transferor's pre-reorganization income.
CURRENT CONFLuCT
The (F) reorganization's expanded definition has been applied in
two types of unrelated situations involving loss carrybacks. The
cases following the holding in Reef Corp. that a complete continuity
of interest is not a requirement of an (F) reorganization have in-
volved the merger of a single operating corporation into a newly
formed corporate shell that lacked its own assets, business, and tax
history.49 The new corporation then has operated the old entity's
business, offering the same products or services and retaining the
same employees and essentially the same customers. The reorgan-
ized corporation, in effect, is the same entity, having altered only
its identity. In contrast, the cases following the holding in Davant
that the merger of two or more operating corporations can be an (F)
reorganization all have involved a complete continuity of share-
holder interest: neither the identity of the stockholders nor their
percentage interests had been changed by the reorganization."0
The current conflict has resulted from attempts to invoke the (F)
reorganization provision when the merger of two or more operating
corporations has not been accompanied by a complete continuity of
shareholder interest. This hybrid situation, which combines certain
factors previously unique to the cases following either Reef Corp. or
Davant, may be illustrated by a hypothetical merger of two corpora-
tions of equivalent value that operate related businesses. Assume
had abandoned its (F) reorganization theory on' appeal, and the IRS consequently had no
opportunity to present its argument to the appellate court. Petition for Rehearing at 4, Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S.T.C. 9120 (1976), rehearing denied, 77-1
U.S.T.C. 9261 (1977).
49. See cases cited note 45 supra.
50. See cases cited notes 33-36 supra.
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initially that A owns all the stock of one corporation and ninety
percent of the second and that B accounts for the remaining ten
percent ownership. After the merger, A will own ninety-five percent
of the stock and B will own five percent. The question arises whether
this merger is an (F) reorganization and whether the transferee cor-
poration may carry back its post-merger losses to the tranferor cor-
porations' pre-merger income. Although no exact continuity of
shareholder interest exists between the old and new corporations,
the adjusted percentage interests in the new entity conform to the
value of the stockholders' interests in the old corporations. More-
over, the old corporations' business continues without significant
change; no substantial shift has occurred in corporate control, and
no new stockholders have been introduced.
In 1977 in Berger Machine Products, Inc. v. Commissioner5' the
Tax Court confronted an analogous factual situation. Berger
Machine involved the merger into a single newly organized corpora-
tion of four corporations conducting related businesses. The trans-
action introduced no new shareholders. Five individuals owned the
stock of the pre-merger corporations, and, although their relative
control remained the same, their percentage interests were altered
as a result of the merger. Following the merger, the new corporation
suffered operating losses, which it attempted to carry back to the
transferor corporations' pre-merger income.
The Tax Court disallowed the carryback.2 Adhering to its pre-
vious decisions, which the Ninth Circuit had reversed, 3 the court
rejected the proposition that two or more operating corporations
could merge in an (F) reorganization." Moreover, the court adopted
the IRS's requirement of complete continuity of shareholder interest
as an essential condition of an (F) reorganization.55
The dissent in Berger Machine argued that the need for consist-
ency in the tax laws required the Tax Court to abandon its conserva-
tive position precluding operating corporations from merging in an
(F) reorganization and to adopt the position of the other federal
51. 68 T.C. 358 (1977).
52. Id. at 365.
53. Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 318 (1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.
1968); Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 277 (1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir.
1968).
54. 68 T.C. at 364.
55. Id. at 364-65.
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courts." According to the dissent, the decision in Aetna should have
controlled the continuity of interest issue because the stockholders
had maintained their individual proprietary interests and their rela-
tive abilities to exercise corporate control; only their numerical per-
centage interests had changed.5
7
Additional similarities between Berger Machine and Aetna exist:
neither case involved the introduction of new stockholders, and in
both situations the businesses continued operations unaffected by
the reorganization. The only substantial difference between the two
cases is that Berger Machine involved a merger of several operating
corporations whose individual business activities prior to the re-
organization became divisions in the new corporation, whereas in
Aetna a single entity's operations were transferred to a newly cre-
ated corporate shell. A rejection of this distinction, however, and an
application of Aetna to the facts in Berger Machine, as noted by the
dissent in the latter case, would have required that the merger be
characterized as an (F) reorganization and that the taxpayer be
permitted to carry back its post-reorganization losses." Neverthe-
less, the Tax Court not only declined to accept this position in
Berger Machine, but it subsequently reaffirmed its narrow construc-
tion of the (F) reorganization provision in Romy Hammes, Inc. v.
Commissioner." The Second Circuit also has indicated that it may
not apply its decision in Aetna to characterize the merger of operat-
ing corporations as an (F) reorganization."
Despite this initial judicial reluctance to extend Aetna's and Reef
Corp.'s holding to situations involving the merger of operating cor-
porations, those cases could present courts with an opportunity for
alleviating the potentially restrictive effect on taxpayers' use of the
(F) reorganization provision created by the IRS's artificial continu-
ity of shareholder interest requirement. An expanded application of
those holdings would provide courts with flexibility in their evalua-
tions of the merits of alleged (F) reorganizations. Under such an
approach, mere shifts in shareholders' percentage interests would
not necessarily jeopardize the characterization of a merger as an (F)
56. Id. at 365 (dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 366.
58. Id.
59. 68 T.C. 900 (1977).
60. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S.T.C. 9261, at 86,523 (2d Cir. 1977)
(denying rehearing to 77-1 U.S.T.C. 9120 (1976)).
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reorganization and thereby prevent the carrying back of corporate
losses to pre-reorganization income. An analysis of the economic
reality reflected in (F) reorganizations and of the congressional in-
tent pertaining to loss carrybacks demonstrates the propriety of this
result.
ECONOMIC REALITY: (F) REORGANIZATIONS
In applying the tax laws to the myriad of potential situations,
courts often have ignored the form of a transaction and focused on
its substance to levy taxes on the basis of economic reality rather
than on formal considerations that are subject to manipulation.6'
The emphasis on substance requires a determination of whether the
particular transaction in issue is a sale or a reorganization, a ques-
tion frequently resolved by ascertaining intent. 2 If the parties in-
tended to produce the results of a reorganization, the judiciary often
holds accordingly, disregarding formalistic steps taken merely to
minimize tax consequences. Thus, to reflect economic reality and
to prevent tax abuse, courts have held transactions structured as
sales or liquidations to be reorganizations. 3 Conversely, if the par-
ties to a transaction intended to purchase corporate assets, the
courts may conclude that a sale rather than a reorganization has
occurred. In such circumstances, the purchaser obtains an adjust-
ment in the basis of the corporate assets that he does not receive in
a reorganization.65
The (F) reorganization is particularly susceptible to a substance
over form analysis because its definition in the Code includes no
specific requirements. Rather, it is a formal change, "however ef-
61. The Supreme Court mandated that the judiciary evaluate the substance of a transac-
tion in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). The Court proscribed the
manipulation of the incidence of taxation by actions having no realistic economic purpose
other than the minimization of tax consequences. Id. at 334.
62. See cases cited note 64 infra.
63. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); Liddon v. Commis-
sioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1956).
64. For example, the purchase of corporate stock for the purpose of acquiring corporate
assets has been characterized as a sale rather than as a reorganization. See, e.g., South Bay
Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965); Yoc Heating Corp. v. Commissioner, 61
T.C. 168 (1973); Estate of Suter v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 244 (1957).
65. In the event of a sale, the purchaser receives a new cost basis in the assets of the
business. I.R.C. § 1012. In a reorganization, however, both the shareholders' stock and the
corporate assets retain their pre-reorganization basis. Id. §§ 358, 362.
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fected."66 Thus, the Fifth Circuit characterized the transaction in
Davant, although formally structured as a sale, as an (F) reorgani-
zation because it resulted in a mere change in corporate identity."7
The (F) reorganization differs conceptually from other reorganiza-
tions in that it cannot include any aspects of an exchange."8 For
example, an (A) reorganization, a statutory merger of two or more
corporations," may involve the combination of separately owned
entities, the shareholders of which exchange their stbck in the trans-
feror corporations for stock in the acquiring corporation. If the same
stockholders owned all the transferor corporations, however, the re-
organization also could qualify and would be treated as an (F) reor-
ganization. 71 In an (F) reorganization, then, the post-reorganization
corporation must be essentially the same entity as the pre-
reorganization corporation or corporations."
Certain factors have been articulated as descriptive of (F) reor-
ganizations. Among the most crucial is that, following the merger,
the business operations continue in essentially the same form as
they had existed before the reorganization.7 Another important con-
sideration is that the transaction creating an (F) reorganization be
structured to avoid the characteristics of a sale and to maintain
stockholder interests. A transaction that introduces new sharehold-
ers, who presumably obtained their ownership interests in exchange
for some consideration, creates more than a formal corporate change
and therefore does not qualify as an (F) reorganization. In contrast,
a percentage shift in the present shareholders' interests does not
necessarily create such an economic change that the corporation's
identity is altered, particularly if the shift does not affect corporate
control.
The decisions in Reef Corp. and Aetna, in which the courts char-
acterized the disputed transactions as (F) reorganizations despite
shifts in the shareholders' percentage interests, involved mergers of
single corporations into newly organized corporate shells. As demon-
66. Id. § 368(a)(1)(F).
67. 366 F.2d at 884.
68. See, e.g., Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 203 (1942).
69. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
70. See, e.g., Griswold v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968); Rev. Rul. 57-276,
1957-1 C.B. 126. See also Estate of Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968).
71. See note 4 supra & accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Home Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165, 1172 (5th
Cir. 1971).
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strated in Davant and its progeny, however, the (F) reorganization
provision is sufficiently flexible to encompass the merger of two or
more operating corporations, at least when the businesses of the pre-
merger corporations are integrated in their operations. Such a
merger should not be denied the status of an (F) reorganization
merely because it creates a shift in the shareholders' percentage
interests. Rather, as with the single corporation reorganizations in
Aetna and Reef Corp., the relevant inquiry in a situation involving
the merger of two or more operating corporations should be whether
the transaction created more than formal corporate changes. Pro-
vided that the merger has not upset the continuity of business oper-
ations, has introduced no new stockholders, and has not altered
corporate control, it should be classified as an (F) reorganization.
Consequently, the IRS's invocation of an absolute continuity of
shareholder interest requirement as a prerequisite for a valid (F)
reorganization involving two or more operating corporations con-
flicts with the requirement that the judiciary evaluate the entire
substance of such transactions.
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: CARRYBACKS
Initially, loss carryovers-both carrybacks to prior years and car-
ryovers to subsequent years-served to provide tax equity by per-
mitting businesses to report fluctuating income patterns exceeding
the length of a single taxable year.73 To achieve this goal, Congress
adopted an averaging technique involving the carryback and car-
ryover of losses to years in which businesses had taxable income. 74
By providing that the ultimate tax levied on a corporation would be
consistent with its income over a particular business cycle, the for-
mula prevents the imposition of a tax on capital immediately after
the business begins to recover its loss of operating cash.75
73. Without the loss carryover provisions, taxpayers would be required to pay taxes on their
annual receipts from a particular contract that extended several years, although they ulti-
mately suffered a loss on the transaction as a whole. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282
U.S. 359 (1931).
74. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 122-23 (1942), reprinted in 1 J. SEIDMAN,
SEIDMAN's LoisLATwiv HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND ExcEss PROFITS TAX LAWS 1953-1939,
at 1907-08 (1954). Throughout World War H, many businesses had been forced to postpone
disbursements for what normally constitute regular expenses and therefore had been paying
taxes on artificial income. Congress was concerned with the effect that the war's end would
have on these businesses. Id.
75. Id.
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Loss carrybacks also provide a business with cash when it is
needed most, at the time of the loss. In its consideration of the
interaction between carrybacks and reorganizations, Congress ac-
knowledged the practical problems confronted by a corporation in
its attempt to cope with financial setbacks." Congress also demon-
strated its awareness of the need for immediate cash generally cre-
ated by business losses when it required that the IRS either reject
or give a refund within ninety days of the taxpayer's filing of a claim
for a tentative carryback adjustment. 7 Consequently, the purpose
of the carryback provision has expanded: rather than merely per-
mitting income averaging to account for fluctuations in the business
cycle, it also assists businesses encountering financial difficulties by
providing them with immediate refunds. An application of the car-
ryback provision to all reasonably qualifying situations that are free
from attempted statutory abuses78 would best effectuate this expan-
sive purpose.
Before 1954, no statutory rules governed the interaction between
the carryback and reorganization provisions. Rather, inconsistent
judicial interpretations based on technicalities filled the void.79 As
a result, loss corporations were sold not for the value of their busi-
ness assets but for the tax value of their loss carryovers, as parties
invoked the letter of the law in attempts to circumvent its policy of
preventing one taxpayer from taking the deductions of another."
76. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as initially proposed, lacked a provision permitting
the carryback of losses in situations involving (F) reorganizations. Congress added such a
provision, I.R.C. § 381(b), after a congressional hearing, in which testimony was given con-
cerning a New York firm that had changed its state of incorporation to New Jersey after many
years of profitable operation. The firm suffered unexpected losses and was forced into bank-
ruptcy when the Commissioner ruled that it was a different corporation and therefore not
entitled to carry back its losses to the income it earned while domiciled in New York. Pugh,
The F Reorganization: Reveille for a Sleeping Giant?, 24 TAx. L. Rav. 437 (1969).
77. See I.R.C. § 6411(b). Before the IRS makes any refund it will credit the tax decrease
resulting from the carryback toward any tax due from the corporation. Id.
78. An abusive application of the carryback provision would occur if a carryback that
would not be allowed in the absence of a reorganization was permitted after the reorganiza-
tion. See Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 388 (1957); Note, Taxation-Net
Operating Loss Carryovers-The Doctrine of Libson Shops & the Single Corporation Cases,
14 WAYNE L. REv. 702 (1968). But see McGaffey, Utilization of Net Operating Losses, 51
TAXEs 613 (1973), who suggests that, because the purchase price would reflect the ability of
a buyer to use the net operating loss, the shareholders who sell a loss corporation would
receive the benefit of the carryover. Id. at 620.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). See also Grainger, The New
Internal Revenue Code: Carry-over & Carry-back of Losses After Corporate Mergers-
Dividends-in-Kind of Appreciated Property, 43 GEO. L.J. 208 (1955).
80. See, e.g., New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1935).
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In 1954, however, Congress added section 381 to the Code.8' Clari-
fying the law and formulating a rule for the use of carrybacks based
"upon economic realities rather than upon such artificialities as
legal form of reorganization,""2 section 381(b) governs the ability of
reorganized corporations to take advantage of the Code's carryback
provisions.1 Consistent with the objective that only those taxpayers
who actually suffered losses receive the benefits of carrybacks, the
section permits only the acquiring corporation in an (F) reorganiza-
tion to carry back a loss to the transferor corporation's pre-
reorganization income. 84 Because an (F) reorganization comprises
only formal changes, the acquiring corporation is the same taxpayer
as the transferor entity.
By authorizing carrybacks after an (F) reorganization, Congress
provides a tax benefit to the transferor corporation's shareholders
who indirectly have paid the excessive pre-reorganization taxes
through their receipt of decreased dividends and who also have suf-
fered the post-reorganization loss through their receipt of dimin-
ished returns and a reduced value in their investment.85 The denial
of a carryback will prevent these stockholders from receiving an
immediate tax benefit, despite their obvious injuries caused by the
corporation's loss and the transferor corporation's payment of exces-
sive taxes. Rather, they may never receive a tax benefit to offset
their injuries, unless the corporation recovers from its loss and earns
future taxable income to which it may apply a loss carryover deduc-
tion.8
A reorganization that adds new shareholders does not qualify as
an (F) type,8 7 and the resulting corporation may not carry back its
losses to the transferor corporation's pre-reorganization income.
Such a result appropriately prevents an immediate tax benefit from
accruing to the new shareholders who were unaffected by the trans-
81. I.R.C. § 381.
82. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4629, 4683.
83. I.R.C. § 381(b). See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
84. I.R.C. § 381(b)(3). For the pertinent text of § 381(b), see note 3 supra.
85. See Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493, 493 (lst Cir. 1956).
86. A taxpayer that cannot carry back a net operating loss may carry the loss over to later
taxable years in which it has taxable income. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(B), (2). Generally, pre-1976
losses must be used within the five taxable years following the loss year, and post-1975 losses
must be used within seven years. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(B).
87. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 77-1 U.S.T.C. J 9120, at 86,093 (2d
Cir. 1976).
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feror corporation's payment of its pre-reorganization taxes. The
mere elimination of some stockholders in a reorganization, however,
should produce a different result, particularly when the transaction
has not altered corporate control. The remaining owners possess the
attributes of those shareholders for whom Congress provided a tax
benefit in its authorization of carrybacks by corporations formed in
(F) reorganizations: they not only indirectly have paid the taxes of
the pre-merger corporation, but they also have suffered the conse-
quences of the post-reorganization loss. A change in their percentage
ownership interests, therefore, should not prevent these continuing
shareholders from receiving the benefits accompanying a carryback.
In Aetna the Second Circuit applied similar reasoning to permit
a carryback when a shift in shareholder interest had occurred in an
(F) reorganization involving a single operating corporation. This
reasoning likewise should apply when some changes in percentage
ownership result from the merger of two or more operating corpora-
tions, assuming that a substantive evaluation denotes the entire
transaction as an (F) reorganization. Absent a substantial'shift in
shareholder control more akin to a sale or exchange than to a reorg-
anization, the failure to characterize such a situation as an (F)
reorganization and a consequent disallowance of the carryback
would deny a tax benefit that Congress created for the reorganized
corporation and its shareholders.
A countervailing policy providing for the limitation of potential
tax abuses could not ameliorate a misapplication of the carryback
provisions. Rather, an inherent facet of the carryback is its lack of
manipulative possibilities in situations involving corporate reorgan-
izations. A post-reorganization loss, the event that creates the possi-
bility of a carryback, generally is unexpected at the time of the
transaction's planning and probably is not taken into account. In-
deed, many reorganizations in which the new corporation has been
prevented from carrying back its losses to pre-reorganization income
easily could have been restructured in form so as to preserve at least
part of the carryback without altering the substance of the reorgani-
zation. For example, in Berger Machine, if the four corporations had
merged into one of the existing entities instead of into a newly
created one, the survivor could have carried the loss back to its own
pre-reorganization income." To change its name or state of incorpo-
88. See id.
89. See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
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ration the surviving corporation then could have merged into a cor-
porate shell, without endangering its carryback privilege."
The strict allocation requirements imposed on the carryback of
post-merger losses to pre-merger income after an (F) reorganization
involving-the merger of operating corporations also limits the poten-
tial for abusing the Code's carryback provisions. A qualifying loss
must be attributable to the business operations conducted by one
of the corporations existing before the reorganization, and the loss
may be carried back only to offset that particular corporation's
income.1 Moreover, as a condition to carrying back a net operating
loss to pre-reorganization income, the taxpayer must bear the bur-
den of establishing this relationship.92 Clearly, the minimal oppor-
tunity for abusing the carryback provisions in reorganization situa-
tions provides little support for the IRS's conclusion that a valid (F)
reorganization must adhere strictly to a technical continuity of
shareholder interest requirement.
CONCLUSION
Through the application of its absolute continuity of shareholder
interest test, the IRS fails to characterize as (F) reorganizations
certain transactions that leave unaltered both business operations
and corporate control and that introduce no new stockholders. Con-
sequently, the IRS prevents the availability of tax benefits, such as
the averaging of business income over several years or the timely
infusion of cash refunds in the event of a net operating loss, in some
of the circumstances that they should be accorded. Although the
IRS's test properly focuses on the corporate shareholders, who ulti-
mately will receive the benefits of any carryback, it creates an overly
rigid requirement of absolute continuity that could impede a sub-
stantive evaluation of a potential (F) reorganization.
Judicial resolution of the disagreement as to the degree of conti-
nuity of interest required for an (F) reorganization appears unlikely.
By refining the definition of the (F) reorganization in an amend-
ment to the Internal Revenue Code, Congress can provide the most
appropriate clarification of the problem. In accordance with both
90. See note 11 supra & accompanying text. For a discussion of Berger Machine, see text
accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
91. Home Constr. Corp. of America v. United States, 439 F.2d 1165, 1172 (5th Cir. 1971);
Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 C.B. 129. See also Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
92. 439 F.2d at 1172.
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the substantive characteristics of an (F) reorganization and the pur-
pose 6f carrybacks, such an amendment should codify the continu-
ity of interest test articulated in Aetna and allow its application to
the merger of operating corporations.

COMMENTS
GAGLIARDI v. FLINT: THE JOINDER OF, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND PENDENT STATE CLAIMS AGAINST A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION IN A FEDERAL FORUM
Municipal governments' assumption of greater responsibility for
societal functions increasingly exposes citizens to the infliction of
legal injury by public employees.1 Relief for such injuries ostensibly
is offered by the Civil Rights Act of 1871,2 which was enacted to
provide redress for actions by state and local officials violating es-
tablished constitutional and statutory rights .3 The Act's broadest
provision, codified as section 1983, awards damages and equitable
relief for invasion of such rights by persons acting under color of
state law or custom.4
A citizen asserting a section 1983 claim may desire to maximize
1. See Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New York Court of Claims, 22 AD.
L. Ra'. 39, 58 (1969). Municipal involvement ranges from the provision of public services such
as education, housing, and fire and police protection to the regulation of business activity
through the licensing of such activities as housing construction and the sale of alcoholic
beverages.
2. Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
3. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 653 (1871)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, priviliges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
The federal district court's original jurisdiction over a § 1983 cause of action is provided by
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-(4) (1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action author-
ized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens of or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to
vote.
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his opportunity for complete recovery by seeking relief against both
the culpable public employee and the municipality. In Monroe v.
Pape,I however, the Supreme Court held that municipalities are not
"persons" within the ambit of section 1983,1 in effect granting mu-
nicipal corporations immunity from civil liability under the Civil
Rights Act. Focusing on the legislative history of the Act, the Court
emphasized that the House of Representatives repeatedly had re-
jected the opportunity to impose such liability on local government
units; consequently, the Court reasoned, municipalities could not
be sued under section 1983.1
Although numerous attempts to circumvent the holding in
Monroe have proved unsuccessful, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Gagliardi v. Flint' recently upheld an action
against a municipal corporation by finding the fourteenth amend-
ment allegations sufficiently substantial to provide a jurisdictional
basis for the federal forum to adjudge pendent state claims. In addi-
tion to examining several approaches advanced by plaintiffs in at-
tempts to provide federal courts with jurisdiction over municipali-
ties, this Comment will analyze Gagliardi and the procedure ap-
proved by the Third Circuit. It concludes that the implementation
5. See notes 62-69 infra & accompanying text.
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. Id. at 191. Monroe involved an action for damages against the city of Chicago and
thirteen Chicago police officers who allegedly subjected the plaintiff, Monroe, to a brutal
search and seizure in his home.
8. Id. at 191-92. The interpretation of § 1983 adopted by the Court in Monroe has been
assailed vigorously by both the judiciary and commentators who have argued, for example,
that this construction derives neither from legislative debate over the meaning of the word
"person" nor from debate on § 1983 generally, but rather from congressional rejection of the
Sherman amendment, which would have made local governments expressly liable for dam-
ages caused by their intentional infringement of certain constitutionally protected interests.
Moreover, only the House of Representatives rejected the amendment, a repudiation based
not on the determination that municipalities should be immune, but on the mistaken notion
that the Congress lacked constitutional authority to impose liability on municipal corpora-
tions. See generally Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 122-26 (1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Kates & Kouba,
Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. 1Ev.
131, 132-36 (1972); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional
Violations, 89 HARv. L. Rxv. 922, 924-25, 949-51 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Damage
Remedies]; Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 US. C. § 1983, 55 MiNN. L.
Rxv. 1201, 1205-07 (1971). But see Note, Implying a Damage Remedy Against Municipalities
Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Congressional Action as an Obstacle to Exten-
sion of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 MD. L. Rav. 123 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Implying a
Damage Remedy].
9. 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977).
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by federal courts of this jurisdictional basis will leave undisturbed
Monroe's interpretation of section 1983 but will permit citizens to
seek redress from many municipal corporations for constitutional
infringements committed by their employees.
OBSTACLES TO IMPOSING LIABILITY ON A MUNICIPALITY IN FEDERAL
COURT
Attempts to sue municipal corporations and thus to bypass the
decision in Monroe have been based either on theories purporting
to sustain independent causes of action in conjunction with federal
question jurisdiction"0 or on state claims deemed pendent to section
1983 actions against individuals included within that provision's
definition of person. For example, in Moor v. County of Alameda,"1
decided by the Supreme Court in 1973, the plaintiffs argued that the
incorporation into section 1983 of a California statute creating vicar-
ious liability against local governments created an independent fed-
eral cause of action. 2 Under a separate federal statutory provision,
codified as section 1988,11 state law may be incorporated into a
10. Two statutes arguably provide federal question jurisdiction for independent causes of
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) grants federal question jurisdiction
for § 1983 causes of action. For the text of § 1343(3), see note 4 supra. In City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), however, the Supreme Court determined that jurisdiction under
§ 1343 was unavailable in § 1983 suits against municipalities. Id. at 513; see notes 16-17 infra
& accompanying text. The ambiguity in Bruno's holding has caused courts and commentators
to argue that the case restricts the applicability of § 1343 solely to § 1983 actions. See Blue
v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 837 (4th Cir. 1974) ( § 1343 and § 1983 co-extensive); Comment, The
Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe, 49 CAL. L. Rav. 145, 148 (1961) ("authorized by law" in §
1343 refers to § 1983). Contra, Gonzalez v. Young, 560 F.2d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 1977);
Bodensteiner, Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Nonpersons" for Deprivations of
Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U. L. Ray. 215, 229-34 (1974); Hundt, Suing Municipalities
Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L. Rav. 770,772 n.13 (1975). Whether
§ 1343 provides jurisdiction for independent causes of action has not been expressly deter-
mined by the Court. See Bodensteiner, supra, at 234.
11. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). Plaintiffs sought to recover actual and punitive damages for
injuries allegedly suffered when an Alameda County deputy sheriff, who was engaged in
quelling a civil distrubance, wrongfully discharged a shotgun. Suit was brought against the
individual sheriffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970), and against the county under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1970). Id. at 695-96.
12. Id. at 698. Plaintiffs argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) permitted the incorpora-
tion of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2(a) (West 1966) into § 1983 and that, consequently, federal
jurisdiction over their action existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970). 411 U.S. at 700-01.
For the pertinent text of § 1343(4), see note 4 supra.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
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federal civil rights act whenever the federal law is "deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies."" The Supreme
Court, however, rejected the argument that section 1988 authorized
the integration of California state law into section 1983, concluding
that such an incorporation would be contrary to Congress' intent
in enacting the latter section."
One month after the decision in Moor, the plaintiff in City of
Kenosha v. Bruno" endeavored to restrict Monroe's application to
actions against municipalities for the recovery of damages and
argued that section 1983 permits suits for equitable relief. Rejecting
this argument, the Supreme Court held that municipal corporations
are outside the ambit of section 1983, whether relief is sought in law
or in equity.17 Thus, after Monroe, Moor, and Bruno, the Court
conclusively had excluded municipalities as potential defendants in
section 1983 suits. 8
Plaintiffs' inability to sue municipal corporations under section
1983 encouraged them to resort to direct causes of action implicitly
authorized by the Constitution. The basis for these actions was the
1971 decision of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 19 in which the Supreme Court permitted a
damages suit against federal narcotics agents who allegedly had
[I]n all cases where [federal laws] are not adopted to the object, or are defi-
cient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offen-
ses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
14. Id.
15. 411 U.S. at 710. The Court evaluated the language and the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, concluding both that § 1988 did not create an independent cause of
action and that the attempted incorporation of the state statute into § 1983 would contravene
the federal law as represented in Monroe. Id. at 703-09.
16. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). Bruno sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the cities
of Kenosha and Racine, which had refused to renew his liquor licenses, allegedly because he
permitted nude dancing in his taverns. In each case, the plaintiff named only the municipal-
ity as a defendant.
17. Id. at 513. As in Moor, see note 15 supra, the Court in Bruno relied on the statutory
language as well as the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to support its
determination that Congress did not intend to subject municipal corporations to a
"bifurcated application" of § 1983 that would vary with the nature of the relief sought. Id.
18. For a listing of the governmental entities excluded from § 1983 liability, see Hundt,
supra note 10, at 772 n.15; 47 Miss. L.J. 799, 802-03 & nn.25-29 (1976).
19. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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deprived the plaintiff of his fourth amendment rights." Although
the facts in Bivens were limited to claims arising from fourth
amendment violations, the case's result suggested that the infringe-
ment of any constitutional right could create a claim litigable in a
federal court, thus permitting suits against municipalities.21
Attempting to extend the holding in Bivens, plaintiffs have
argued that the fourteenth amendment protects their federal rights
from infringement by state and local governments.2 2 The availabil-
ity of the remedy recognized in Bivens, however, has been uncer-
tain, and the lower courts have reached conflicting conclusions as
to the case's applicability in suits against municipal corporations.
Although some courts have restricted the scope of Bivens to fourth
amendment violations,2 others have extended the case's holding to
all federal claims based on alleged constitutional infringementsu
and thus have permitted damages suits for alleged violations of the
fourteenth amendment.? In addition to the judiciary's division over
20. Id. at 397.
21. See Bodensteiner, supra note 10, at 221; Hundt, supra note 10, at 772; Damage Reme-
dies, supra note 8, at 926. Of course, a potential plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). For the text of § 1331(a), see note 10 supra.
22. For analyses of the use of Bivens to support a judicially created cause of action asserting
fourteenth amendment rights directly against a municipality, see Bodensteiner, supra note
10, at 217-22; Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
Rzv. 1532 (1972); Hundt, supra note 10, at 772-75; Damage Remedies, supra note 8, at 929-
59.
23. See, e.g., Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Colo. 1974); Davidson v.
Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922, 924-25 (E.D. Va. 1972). See also Cardinale v. Washington Technical
Inst., 500 F.2d 791, 796 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Archuleta v. Callaway, 385 F. Supp. 384, 388
(D. Colo. 1974); Smothers v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 622, 625-26 n.4
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (dictum).
24. Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 734 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, id. at
736 (1975) (en banc); accord, Gardes v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. fI1. 1974)
("Bivens recognizes a cause of action for damages for violation of any constitutionally pro-
tected interest."); see States Marine Lines v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974)
(fifth amendment); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koezler, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1972)
(fifth amendment); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1164-65 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1061 (1972) (fourth and fifth amendments); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156
(N.D. 111. 1975) (fourteenth amendment); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp. 1133, 1138-39 (E.D.
Cal. 1975) (first and fifth amendments).
25. Fourteenth amendment claims have been recognized in suits involving, inter alia,
police misconduct, Redding v. Medicci, 402 F. Supp. 1260, 1261 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated on
other grounds, 411 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156
(N.D. 111. 1975) (illegal arrest and detention); mistreatment in prison, Wattenberg v. New
York City, Dep't of Correction, 376 F. Supp. 41, 43-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (cruel and unusual
punishment); dismissals of public employees, Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515,
523 F.2d 569, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Skehan v. Board of
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the ultimate breadth of Bivens, several courts either have refused
to recognize the existence of a constitutional cause of action against
municipalities"6 or have been reluctant to adjudicate the issues in-
volved in such suits.Y The disparate holdings by lower courts con-
cerning the applicability of Bivens have cast doubt on the viability
of direct constitutional attacks against municipal defendants. 21
Alternative attempts to sue municipalities have been based on
the theory of pendent jurisdiction, which "permits a plaintiff, in
appropriate circumstances, to join with his federal claim a state
claim over which the court has no independent basis of subject
matter jurisdiction."29 In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs"' the Su-
preme Court articulated the two prerequisites for obtaining pendent
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975);
Barszcz v. Board of Trustees of Community College, 400 F. Supp. 675, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 1080 (1977); see Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d
429, 432-33 (4th Cir. 1974) (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting); racial discrimination,
Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (backpay
and reinstatement); Robinson v. Conlisk, 385 F. Supp. 529, 536 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd in
pertinent part, rev'd on other grounds, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); deprivation of property
without due process of law, Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976); Brault
v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732-35 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, id. at 736 (1975)
(en banc); Donohue Constr. Co. v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 398
F. Supp. 21, 23-24 & n.2 (1975); Stephens v. City of Plano, 375 F. Supp. 985, 986 (E.D. Tex.
1974); Grisson v. County of Roanoke, 348 F. Supp. 321, 322 (W.D. Va. 1972); see Dahl v. City
of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (zoning); and other alleged constitutional
violations. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (action for damages for
sterilization under allegedly unconstitutional statute).
26. Courts often have dismissed § 1983 suits against municipalities without acknowledging
that claims might exist under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Jones v. Marshall, 528
F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 964 (1975); Howard v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
27. The Third Circuit avoided reaching a decision on the merits of an action based directly
on the fourteenth amendment in Mahoney v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977). The Third
Circuit also failed to decide the "difficult and troublesome constitutional questions" of
"substantive liability and municipal immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment." Fine v.
City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 76 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Brault v. Town of Milton,
527 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28. See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977), in which the majority and concurring
opinions debated at length whether the Third Circuit has recognized such a cause of action.
Id. at 115 n.3, 117-19. The principal rationale for rejecting the extension of Bivens to four-
teenth amendment claims against municipalities derives from the concept of federalism and
from the Court's interpretation of congressional intent underlying § 1983. Damage Remedies,
supra note 8, at 927-29. See also Hundt, supra note 10, at 773-75; Comment, Aldinger v.
Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 127, 138 n.58 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Pendent Jurisdiction]; Implying a Damage Remedy, supra note 8, at 124-25.
29. Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 128. For a comprehensive history of the doc-
trine's evolution, see id. at 129-35. See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6-16 (1976).
30. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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jurisdiction: first, the federal claim must be of sufficient substance
to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court;3' and second, the
state and federal claims must derive from a "common nucleus of
operative fact", 3 such that they ordinarily would be tried together
in one judicial proceeding. 33 If these prerequisites were met, a plain-
tiff would make a municipality a pendent party by joining his state
cause of action against the municipality to a section 1983 claim
against the culpable official."
The Supreme Court's decision in Aldinger v. Howard,3 5 however,
limited the availability of this procedure. Distinguishing pendent
claims from pendent parties, the Court held that the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction does not authorize the joinder of a state claim
against a party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction ex-
31. Id. at 725.
32. Id. Decisions subsequent to Gibbs have held that a loose factual connection between
the claims is sufficient to satisfy this "common nucleus" requirement. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-
Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975); Hamilton v. Chaffin, 506 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1975);
Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1974); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Knuth v. Erie Crawford Daily Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir.
1968); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Bowman v. Hartig, 334
F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). If the two claims are totally independent, however, the
district court may exercise its jurisdiction only over the federal action. See, e.g., PAAC v.
Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1974); Hales v. Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc., 500 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1974); Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d
589 (10th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891
(1968); Ryan v. New Castle County, 365 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1973); Spens'v. Citizens Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Ely v. Velde, 356 F. Supp. 726 (E.D.
Va. 1973); Weiss v. Supasco, 295 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
33. 383 U.S. at 725. The Court cautioned that the acceptance of pendent jurisdiction is
discretionary with the court. In deciding whether to implement the doctrine, a court may
consider, inter alia, judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the litigants, comity, federal-
ism, the possibility of jury confusion, and the state claim's dominance in the action. Id. at
726-27.
34. A pendent party claim requires joinder of a new party "against whom or by whom no
claim is asserted which has an independent jurisdictional base." Fortune, Pendent Jurisdic-
tion- The Problem of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1, 1 (1972). For additional
commentary on pendent party jurisdiction, see 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MIER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE MD PROCEDURE: JURISDICON § 3567 (1975); Bratton, Pendent Jurisdiction
in Diversity Cases -Some Doubts, 11 SAN Dio L. REV. 296 (1974); Sullivan, Pendent
Jurisdiction: The Impact of Hagans and Moor, 7 1N. L. REV. 925, 942-59 (1974); Note, UMW
u. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1968); Note, Federal Pendent Party
Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs -Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62
VA. L. Rav. 194 (1976); Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 127 (1977); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of
Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1263 (1975).
35. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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ists.35 A section 1983 suit against a municipal officer cannot provide
a federal court with independent jurisdiction over a municipal cor-
poration, which is exempt from such actions; consequently,
Aldinger precludes the joinder of a state claim against a municipal-
ity with a federal claim brought under section 1983.31 The decision
in Aldinger thus further insulates municipalities from liability in
federal courts for their constitutional violations.
JOINDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND PENDENT STATE CLAIMS
In Gagliardi v. Flint38 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
sanctioned another procedure through which municipalities could
be subjected to liability in federal courts for their infringement of
plaintiffs' guaranteed federal rights. After her son had been fatally
shot by a Philadelphia police officer, the plaintiff filed suit against
the city in federal district court. The district court invoked its juris-
diction over the municipality as to two of the causes of action.39 The
plaintiff had based one of these claims directly on the fourteenth
amendment, alleging a denial of life, and had asserted the other as
a pendent state claim under the Pennsylvania Survival" and
Wrongful Death Statutes." The Third Circuit affirmed."
Substantiality
The Third Circuit approved the use of the fourteenth amendment
36. Id. at 10.
37. See, e.g., Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28
U. FLA. L. Rxv. 904, 919 n.122 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Federalism].
38. 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 114.
40. The Pennsylvania Survival Statute, 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3371 (Purdon 1975),
provides: "All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, except actions for slander or
libel, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of one or more
joint plaintiffs or defendants."
41. The Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Statute, 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1601 (Purdon
1953), provides:
Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no
suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the widow
of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may
maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned.
42. 564 F.2d at 114. The court based its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970).
Although § 1331 federal question jurisdiction was not pleaded in the original proceedings, the
court of appeals invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1970) to permit the plaintiff to amend the jurisdic-
tional statement. 564 F.2d at 114. For the pertinent text of § 1331, see note 10 supra. For the
pertinent text of § 1343, see note 4 supra.
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claim in Gagliardi, not to hold the municipality liable, but to estab-
lish an independent jurisdictional basis enabling the district court
to adjudicate the pendent state cause of action. By finding the
constitutional claim sufficiently substantial to vest the district
court with federal question jurisdiction," the appellate court com-
bined the Bivens and pendent jurisdiction doctrines to impose lia-
bility on a municipality without resort to section 1983.
Although the substantiality test has been characterized as "more
ancient than analytically sound",44 its use for determining federal
jurisdiction nevertheless has been retained by the Supreme Court."
In Gagliardi the Third Circuit's determination that the plaintiff's
fourteenth amendment claim was sufficiently substantial derived
initially from the court's recognition that in Mount Healthy School
District Board of Education v. Doyle" the Supreme Court expressly
reserved the issue whether, by analogy to its decision in Bivens, a
plaintiff could imply a cause of action directly from the fourteenth
amendment that would not be subject to the limitations of section
1983.11 The absence of a Supreme Court holding specifically
deciding the question of the substantiality of a direct fourteenth
amendment suit based on Bivens, combined with the numerous
decisions in other courts permitting such causes of action,"' indi-
cated to the court that the constitutional claim was not so "'de-
void of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within thejurisdiction of the District Court.'"" Having obtained jurisdic-
tion, the district court could adjudicate the pendent state claim,
and the Third Circuit thus could avoid resolution of the difficult
constitutional question0 expressly reserved by the Court in Mount
Healthy. Such an approach comported with the doctrine of judicial
restraint in that constitutional issues unnecessary to the case's dis-
position were not adjudicated.51
43. 564 F.2d at 116.
44. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970).
45. See, e.g., Hagans v. Ltvine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-
83 (1946).
46. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
47. 464 F.2d at 115 (quoting 429 U.S. at 278).
48. See note 25 supra.
49. 564 F.2d at 116 (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974)).
50. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546-47 & n.12 (1974).
51. The Supreme Court repeatedly has indicated that the federal courts should refrain
from the adjudication of constitutional issues when alternative grounds, including state
claims, for disposing of litigation exist. See, e.g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629
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Consistency with Prior Case Law
By combining the fourteenth amendment and the pendent state
claim, the Third Circuit did not contravene the prior standard es-
poused by the Supreme Court.2 Because a section 1983 suit was not
used to support the pendent state claim, the court in Gagliardi was
not bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe that munici-
palities were not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.0
Moreover, the result in Gagliardi presents no conflict with the Su-
preme Court's holding in Aldinger that, for purposes of pendent
jurisdiction, a federal court may not adjudicate state claims against
a party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction exists. 4
Aldinger precluded the joinder of a state claim against a separate
pendent party to a section 1983 cause of action under which the
court could exercise no jurisdiction over the defendant in the state
action. In Gagliardi, however, the City of Philadelphia was the de-
fendant in both the federal and the state claims; 5 the Third Circuit
thus permitted the joinder of a pendent state claim with a constitu-
tional claim under which the district court already had attained a
jurisdictional basis over the defendant municipality.
On the other hand, the two prerequisites for pendent jurisdiction
enunciated in Gibbs" were present in Gagliardi. As previously
noted, the constitutional claim, which alleged that the Philadelphia
police officer's actions had deprived the plaintiff's son of his four-
teenth amendment right to life, was sufficiently substantial to pro-
vide the district court with jurisdiction over the municipality. 7 In
addition, both claims arose from the fatal shooting and clearly
stemmed from a common nucleus of operative fact. Consequently,
the existing case law did not preclude the district court's decision
(1946); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.,
213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909); Seals v. Quarterly County Court, 526 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1975).
See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-49 (1974).
52. See notes 6-8, 11-18, 35-37 supra & accompanying text.
53. See notes 7-8 supra & accompanying text.
54. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
55. For the proposition that the Court should extend the rationale in Aldinger from its
application to pendent party jurisdiction to ordinary pendent jurisdiction, see Pendent Juris-
diction, supra note 28, at 148-49.
56. See notes 30-34 supra & accompanying text. A letter-brief filed by the City of Philadel-
phia with the court of appeals in Gagliardi protested vigorously the use of the fourteenth
amendment cause of action to obtain federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff allegedly never
relied on that portion of her complaint in the trial court. Letter-brief for Appellant at 4.
57. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
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to extend its jurisdiction to the pendent state claim.
Litigants attempting to use the procedure approved in Gagliardi
must be certain that their claims based directly on the fourteenth
amendment are substantial in nature." This requirement, however,
nevertheless permits the assertion of constitutional claims for a wide
variety of injuries59 because governmental actions have had an in-
creasingly significant impact on individuals. Another potential ob-
stacle to the assertion of the theory advanced in Gagliardi is the
failure of state law to provide for a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Absent such a waiver, a pendent state claim cannot be maintained,
and the plaintiff could recover in federal court only if he litigated
successfully a direct cause of action against the municipality under
the fourteenth amendment." This restriction presents little threat
to suits against many municipalities, given the present trend to
dispense entirely with municipal immunity."
Policy Perspective
An injured plaintiff seeking relief for the deprivation of his federal
rights by a municipal employee ideally would attempt to sue both
the municipality and the individual committing the violation, to
litigate the action in a federal rather than in a state tribunal, and
to consolidate his federal and state claims through the use of pen-
dent jurisdiction. Under the Third Circuit's approach in Gagliardi,
each of these goals may be achieved.
58. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682-83 (1946).
59. For example, in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), plaintiff's allegation that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation imprisoned him and subjected his home to a search was found to be
a substantial claim. Id. at 683. In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), the plaintiff's
allegation that the operation of a welfare regulation designed to recoup certain payments from
the plaintiff constituted a substantial deprivation was held to be sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion on the federal court. Id. at 538. But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), in which the
Court cautioned that not every injury caused by a state official acting under color of state
law could be deemed a substantial violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 699. In
Davis the Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment's guarantees of liberty and prop-
erty rights do not protect individuals' reputations from defamation. Id. at 709.
60. For a discussion of the viability of a direct constitutional cause of action against a
municipal defendant, see notes 22-28 supra & accompanying text.
61. For a compilation of cases in which states have abolished governmental immunity,
see Long v. Weirton, - W. Va. -, 214 S.E.2d 832, 854 (1975). The court in Ayala v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, _...._, 305 A.2d 877,889 (1973), listed the position
of the various states regarding the decline of governmental immunity under both statutory
and common law. See also Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983,
55 MINN. L. Rav. 1201, 1216 n.75 (1971).
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From a practical standpoint, allowing an injured citizen to sue
both the municipal corporation and its culpable employee is prefer-
able to restricting the imposition of liability to the individual perpe-
trator.12 Frequently, the commission of violations by groups of gov-
ernmental employees hinders subsequent identification of the po-
tential individual defendants. In such instances the victim may be
denied adequate relief.6 3
The partial immunity of public servants from legal liability fur-
ther demonstrates the practical necessity of permitting plaintiffs to
sue municipal corporations. The rationale for defenses such as good
faith and scope of duty64 is that the public's interest in the adminis-
tration of laws requires the alleviation of a public servant's fear of
personal liability for injuries resulting from the performance of his
duties. 5 Public officials should not be so fearful of potential per-
sonal liability that they hesitate to perform their responsibilities;
the victims of these officials' constitutional transgressions, however,
should not be denied an adequate remedy. By providing compensa-
tion for these injured citizens, a municipality would not discourage
individual officers from enforcing the law.66
Even if public servants are not immune, juries often are sympa-
thetic toward an officer who simply has attempted to perform his
62. The Court in Monroe acknowledged that it failed to weigh certain policy considerations
in its decision to exempt municipalities from § 1983 liability. Specifically, the Court stated
that it had not examined whether municipal corporations should be subject to liability be-
cause "private remedies against officers for illegal searches and seizures [were] conspicu-
ously ineffective, and that municipal liability [would] not only afford plaintiffs responsible
defendants but would cause those defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the police
level." 365 U.S. at 191.
After considering many of the policy implications of municipal immunity, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights recommended that § 1983 be amended to reverse Monroe
legislatively. Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 143 n.67 (citing U.S. COMM'N ON Cwm I iGHTS,
LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 179 (1965)).
63. See, e.g., Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1265, 1271, 1281-82, 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975) (court upheld acquittal of all 69 defendant police officers
partially because plaintiffs failed to prove which particular policemen fired shots); Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279-84 (3d Cir. 1972) (affirmed directed verdict for two police officers
alleged to have brutally beaten plaintiff: plaintiff failed to prove whether defendants were
the policemen who administered beating).
64. Other such defenses include the absolute or qualified privileges held by some govern-
ment officers. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959).
65. K. DAvis, ADMImSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.17 (1970 Supp.).
66. The establishment of a system rendering municipalities liable for their employees'
actions arguably could encourage governmental employees to violate the Constitution or, at
least, could remove an important deterrent to such actions. But see text accompanying notes
70-71 infra.
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duty. 7 Moreover, a plaintiff who successfully litigates his claim may
be unable to collect from an officer who has limited funds.68 By
permitting an injured party to sue the municipality, however, both
of these problems may be eliminated; juries would be less subjective
in their evaluation of the merits of the plaintiffs action, and a
successful litigant would be assured of receiving his entire damages
award. 9
The imposition of municipal liability also would provide a more
effective deterrent to future constitutional violations by public em-
ployees than does the unsatisfactory exclusionary rule or the spo-
radic imposition of individual tort liability.7" The economic pressure
of potential damages awards could provide municipal supervisors
with a greater incentive to control their subordinates' conduct. Be-
cause supervisors would be required to enforce more strictly suspen-
sion or dismissal penalties against culpable employees, they conse-
quently would encourage those employees to act only within the
scope of their authority.1
Federal courts provide a forum preferable to state tribunals for
adjudicating the type of state claims involved in Gagliardi. Initially,
the federal district court's invocation of the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine to join a federal and state claim not only provides a conven-
ience for the litigants but also promotes judicial economy.72 With
the consolidation of two potential proceedings into one, the parties
incur lower court costs and avoid the problems raised by inconsist-
ent adjudications or by the municipality's subsequent assertion of
collateral estoppel as a defense.73 In addition, adjudication by a
federal district court judge, whose life tenure helps to insulate him
from political pressure, may enable an injured plaintiff to avoid the
potential for bias in a state judge's review of other state officials'
67. See Damage Remedies, supra note 8, at 926.
68. Id. Many municipalities, however, provide tort liability insurance for their employees.
69. See Hundt, supra note 10, at 779.
70. K. DAVIS, supra note 65, at § 25.17. See generally Hundt, supra note 10, at 782-83;
Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 140-41; Damage Remedies, supra note 8, at 927; Implying a
Damage Remedy, supra note 8, at 125-26.
71. K. DAvIs, supra note 65, at § 25.17.
72. United Mine Worker v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
73. Minahan, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction of United States Federal District Courts,
10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 279, 321 n.198 (1976). See generally Comment, Section 1983 and the
New Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 49, 89
(1976).
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actions." Finally, the selection of juries in federal proceedings from
broad-based citizen pools helps to ensure their impartiality. 7
Critics contend that the procedure approved in Gagliardi of in-
voking pendent jurisdiction compromises federalism and forces fed-
eral courts to assume jurisdiction over a broad range of traditional
state functions."8 Under the doctrine established in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 7  however, federal courts have obtained vast experience
in the adjudication and application of state law.78 Should they com-
mit errors of law, appellate review is available. Moreover, because
a decision to accept pendent jurisdiction is discretionary with the
court, federal judges will abstain from deciding state claims, even
those properly joined with valid federal allegations, that require the
expert consideration available only in a state court.79
Others might argue that the extensive use of the pendent jurisdic-
tion procedure will flood the federal court docket with frivolous
claims.80 Such actions could be rejected immediately, however,
under the substantiality test,8 1 which authorizes dismissal of a
pendent state claim "if the federal claim to which it is attached is
74. Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HAv. L. REv. 1352, 1358 (1970). See
generally Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 145-46; 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1103, 1111-12 (1975).
75. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-1871 (1970 & Supp.
1978). The United States Commission on Civil Rights discussed the problem of discrimina-
tion in state juries. See 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1103, 1112 & n.54 (1975), (citing [1961] COMM'N
ON CrmL IRoHTs REP. bk. 5, at 92-94 (1961)).
76. See Federalism, supra note 37, at 916. See generally Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of
Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 LAW. & Soc. ORD. 557; Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv. 262 (1968).
77. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court in Erie held that federal common law is inapplicable in
diversity cases and that, in such situations, a federal court must apply the substantive law
of the state in which it sits. Id. at 78.
78. See Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concur-
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JOINDER OF CLAIMS
so insubstantial that it cannot serve as the basis for federal question
jurisdiction under the general federal question statute. 8 2 Inasmuch
as plaintiffs will continue to bring section 1983 suits against munici-
pal officers in federal courts, they simultaneously could assert their
claims against the pertinent municipalities, aid the two defendants
could be tried concurrently. Ultimately, then, the approach ap-
proved in Gagliardi could reduce the total number of suits brought,
in that all the federal and state claims deriving from a common
nucleus of operative fact could be adjudicated in one proceeding.
CONCLUSION
In Gagliardi v. Flint, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a claim against a municipality based on a fourteenth
amendment violation by a government employee was sufficiently
substantial to vest jurisdiction in the federal district court. Having
jurisdiction, the district court adjudicated the pendent state claim
and thus rendered unnecessary a decision on the constitutional
question. This procedure provides an interim solution to a problem
created by the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape, which
held that municipal corporations could not be sued under section
1983. It likewise is consistent with the Court's holding in Aldinger
v. Howard, which precludes the joinder of a pendent claim against
a separate party, because the municipal corporation would be the
defendant in both the federal and state claims. In providing a fed-
eral forum in which victims of constitutional infringements by mu-
nicipal employees can sue the municipalities directly, this approach
permits complete economic remuneration for those plaintiffs who,
for a variety of reasons, otherwise might be unable to recover from
the particular wrongdoer.
82. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-43 (1974) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
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